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Abstract
We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with
private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make
their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a
hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish
message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely
unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent
with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.
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1 Introduction
Many conflicts in human history involved acts of third-party provocation. In the midst of
World War I, Germany sent what is now known as the “Zimmermann Telegram” to Mexico.
This telegram proposed “an understanding on [Germany’s] part that Mexico is to reconquer
the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona,” and its purpose was to provoke Mexico
into conflict with the U.S., thereby delaying the U.S. from going to war with Germany in
Europe. The authenticity of the intercepted telegram was publicly confirmed by the German
Foreign Secretary, which made the provocation public, if ultimately unsuccessful at engaging
Mexico in the war effort. Other examples of third-party provocation include the promotion
of the Tutsi minority to positions of power over the Hutu by the Germans, and later the
Belgians, in colonial Rwanda,1 and the instigation of conflict between the Muslims and the
Hindu by the British in India.2
History is also rife with examples of third-party peacemaking. The promotion of universal
peace through nonviolent means such as communication was a central principle of Tolstoyism,
a movement inspired by Leo Tolstoy in the late nineteenth century. The same principle
inspired the movements led by Mahatma Gandhi, who communicated with Tolstoy, and
Martin Luther King, Jr.3 The anti-nuclear movement, which gained prominence following
the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and protests against the Vietnam War provide
other prominent examples of nonviolent and successful calls for peace.
The present paper uses a controlled experiment to study whether and how conflict be-
tween two rival players can be manipulated by an interested third party through public
communication. Can a third-party provocateur increase the likelihood of conflict by making
a strategic provocation? Can a third-party peacemaker reduce its likelihood by making pub-
lic calls for peace? Although manipulation of conflict can have far-reaching economic and
political consequences, surprisingly little empirical work has investigated it in economics.
Our first and primary research question is the following:
Question 1. Can an interested third party manipulate the likelihood of conflict through
1Ethnic conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu continues to this day and played a major role in con-
tributing to the Rwandan genocide (Mamdani, 2014).
2In a discussion of British colonial policy in India, Stewart (1951) quotes Brigadier John Coke as follows:
“Our endeavor should be to uphold in full force the (fortunate for us) separation which exists between
different religions and races, and not to endeavor to amalgamate them. Divide et empera should be the
principle of the Indian Government.”
3President Obama, in a 2010 address to the Parliament of India, has said: “I am mindful that I might
not be standing before you today, as President of the United States, had it not been for Gandhi and the
message he shared with America and the world.” President Jimmy Carter called Martin Luther King, Jr.
“the conscience of his generation.”
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public announcements?
In theory, communication by a third party can be effective even if this third party cannot
influence the payoffs of the conflicting parties directly. When the third party has private
information about one of the conflicting players’ incentives and the conflicting players’ actions
are strategic complements, as they are in many conflict situations, strategic communication
can provoke one of the players into being hawkish, which in turn triggers an hawkish response
from the player’s opponent (e.g., Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2012). We call this the strategic
communication hypothesis. If the conflicting parties care about the payoffs of the third
party, its mere presence could make their behavior more or less hawkish independent of
message content (e.g., Bland and Nikiforakis, 2015). We refer to this as the third party social
preferences hypothesis.4 Uninformative public announcements could also be influential simply
through their suggestive power (e.g., Schelling, 1980; Charness, 2000). This is the focal point
hypothesis. The three possibilities outlined above motivate our second research question:
Question 2. What channels underlie the effects of provocation and peacemaking on the
likelihood of conflict?
The baseline condition in our experiment is a 2 × 2 conflict game in which each player
has private information about his cost of being hawkish. In the first treatment, we introduce
a third party peacemaker that is commonly known to strictly prefer all players to be dovish.
In the second treatment, we introduce a third party who is commonly known to prefer Player
1 to be hawkish and Player 2 to be dovish. That is, the third party is a provocateur who
benefits from conflict. In both treatments, the third party has private information about
one of the players and is allowed to make public cheap talk announcements before players
choose their actions. In the absence of focal point effects and social preferences toward the
third party, the peacemaker’s messages have no effect on behavior and his presence does not
affect the likelihood of conflict in equilibrium. The game with the provocateur, in contrast,
admits a unique informative communication equilibrium in which strategic communication
leads to a higher likelihood of conflict.
We find that public cheap talk announcements by an interested third party have a sta-
tistically significant effect on behavior in both of our treatments. I.e., we answer Question
1 in the affirmative. To study the underlying channels (Question 2), we explore the mes-
sage senders’ communication strategies as well as the message receivers’ responses to the
4In our theoretical analysis of the effect of social preferences, we focus on a special case of the model in
Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2002). In the text, we refer to Charness and Rabin (2002)-style
social preferences as “social preferences” for short.
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messages. Irrespective of the message sender’s identity, we find that communication in the
experiment does not convey private information. This allows us to rule out the strategic
communication hypothesis.
All message-sending strategies, including those we identify in the data, are consistent with
uninformative equilibrium behavior on the part of the message-senders. While uninformative
messages are ignored in equilibrium, we find receivers to be more hawkish following hawkish
messages and more dovish following dovish messages. While these findings are inconsistent
with equilibrium behavior on the part of message receivers, they are consistent with the focal
point hypothesis. In particular, we suggest that third party messages focus the attention of
the conflicting parties on specific courses of action. To the extent that a player is neither a
dominant hawk nor a dominant dove, he is a coordination type that plays a hawkish (resp.,
dovish) action when the probability of his opponent playing a hawkish (resp., dovish) action
is sufficiently high. When it is likely that both players are coordination types, as it is in our
experiment, the messages could induce a coordinated response.
To investigate the effect of social preferences toward the third party, we study how the
message receivers are affected by the identity of the message sender. Conditional on a
dovish message being sent, we find that the receivers are no less likely to be hawkish when
the message is sent by a peacemaker than when it is sent by a provocateur. This provides
evidence against the third party social preferences hypothesis.5
Our results shed light on the channels through which manipulation of conflict can occur
and highlight several behavioral regularities. In particular, they complement the theoretical
work of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) by showing that third-party cheap talk communication
can be influential even when it conveys no private information. The rest of our paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and experimental literature.
In Section 3, we discuss our experimental design. In Section 4, we present our results. Section
5 discusses the results and possible directions for future work.
5We find other evidence against third party social preferences. Exploiting the observation that commu-
nication is uninformative, we derive equilibrium predictions about the effect of social preferences in both of
our treatments. All else equal, social preferences toward the third party should lead to more hawkish behav-
ior in the presence of a provocateur and less hawkish behavior in the presence of a peacemaker, compared
to the baseline conflict game. While the presence of a peacemaker made hawkish behavior less likely, the
presence of the provocateur had no effect on the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, even in the presence of
social preferences, uninformative communication is disregarded in equilibrium. This is not what we observe
in the data.
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2 Related Literature
Schelling (1980) recognized the possible effect of third party communication,6 arguing that
“when there is no apparent focal point for agreement, ... [the third party] can create one by
his power to make a dramatic suggestion.” McAdams and Nadler (2005) explore Schelling’s
idea about third party communication in a game of conflict under complete information.7 We
depart from McAdams and Nadler in several important directions. First, players in our games
have incomplete information about their opponents’ incentives, which allows us to investigate
strategic communication. Second, the third player in our experiment is biased, and variation
in his payoffs allows us to explore the effect of social preferences on behavior. Third, the
incentives in our experiment are different from those in McAdams and Nadler. While we
consider a game of conflict in which the actions are strategic complements, McAdams and
Nadler focus on the case of strategic substitutes.
A strand of literature employs recommended play to study equilibrium selection. Van Huyck
et al (1992) and Brandts and MacLeod (1995) investigate the effect of recommending equilib-
rium strategies to players. Cason and Sharma (2007) study whether private rather than pub-
lic recommendations can implement a correlated equilibrium in a hawk-dove game. In these
papers, recommendations are made by the experimenter whose incentives may be unknown
to the subjects, while the main ingredient of our experiment is strategic recommendations
by a third player with a commonly known bias.
Bland and Nikiforakis (2015) study how third party externalities affect behavior in a two
player coordination game. If third party messages have no strategic content (as observed
in our data), the presence of the third party in our experiment can be thought of as an
externality that affects subjects through social preferences. Consistent with the findings of
Bland and Nikiforakis (2015), we find that this externality does not affect subjects’ behavior
in the direction predicted by social preferences in the case where the active players’ incentives
are misaligned with those of the third party (the provocateur). However, unlike the third
party in Bland and Nikiforakis (2015), the third party in our experiment is active rather
than passive. Moreover, the third parties in our experiment affected subjects’ behavior by
6“[...] a third player with a payoff structure of his own who is given an influential role through his control
over communication.” Schelling (1980, pag. 144)
7The control in McAdams and Nadler (2005) is a symmetric Hawk-Dove game with complete information
which has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (Hawk,Dove) and (Dove,Hawk). Their treatments are: 1)
spinning a wheel which selects (Hawk,Dove) or (Dove,Hawk) with 50-50 chance in front of the subjects;
2) using an additional subject, called the leader, who opens an envelope containing a recommendation to
either play (Hawk,Dove) or (Dove,Hawk); 3) same as 2) but with the leader publicly chosen as the highest
scorer in a test.
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virtue of their messages and not simply their presence. Galbiati and Vertova (2008) study
a public goods game with exogenous obligations. Their experiment is vaguely related to
ours because the obligations can be viewed as third party suggestions. However, at least in
theory, some of the suggestions in our paper have equilibrium effects while those in Galbiati
and Vertova (2008) are always ineffective.
3 Experimental Design
The basic building block of our experiment is the two player conflict game shown in Figure
1, which is adapted from Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012). Two players, Player 1 and Player
2, simultaneously choose one of two actions, Hawkish and Dovish. A dovish player gains
95 points against a dovish opponent, and gains only 10 points if the opponent is hawkish.
Player i has to pay a cost of ci ≥ 0 for being hawkish. Being hawkish against a hawkish
opponent results in a payoff equal to 95−ci, while a gain of 10 additional points occurs if the
opponent is dovish. We assume that the cost parameter ci is private information of Player
i. Thus, Player i knows ci but does not know cj. It is common knowledge that the costs
c1 and c2 are independently drawn from the same uniform distribution with full support on
[0, 95].8
We incorporate incomplete information in the experiment for several reasons. First, this
is a realistic feature of many conflict situations.9 The assumption that each player has
private information about his cost of being hawkish is a convenient, albeit simplistic, way
to model uncertainty. Second, incomplete information is necessary for studying the effect
of strategic communication on manipulation of conflict. Third, with complete information,
three cases are possible depending on the realizations of cost parameters: i) both players
have a commonly known dominant strategy; ii) one player has a dominant strategy while
the other player is a coordination type; or iii) both players are coordination types. The first
two cases are uninteresting, while the latter deals with subjects’ ability to coordinate on
an equilibrium and has already received significant attention in the literature. Incomplete
information, by contrast, generates a unique equilibrium prediction in our environment.
The parametrization of the game in Figure 1 implies that players’ actions are strategic
complements. That is, each player’s best response is increasing in the belief that the opponent
is hawkish. This is a natural assumption in a game of conflict. As shown in Appendix A,
8In the experiment, the software approximated costs up to 3 decimal digits.
9Does a country possess weapons of mass destruction? How much political will does a country have to
engage in a conflict?
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Player 1
Player 2
Hawkish Dovish
Hawkish 95− c1, 95− c2 105− c1, 10
Dovish 10, 105− c2 95, 95
Table 1: Payoff matrix when no third party is present.
this game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in cutoff strategies: Player i chooses the
hawkish action if and only if ci ≤ 47.5. Note that the equilibrium cutoff strategy is also a
best response to the belief that the opponent is simply randomizing over actions with equal
probability.
We introduce two treatments to study Question 1. In the first treatment, equilibrium
uniquely predicts manipulation of conflict to be ineffective. In the second, manipulation
of conflict is theoretically possible. Specifically, the first treatment adds a third player to
the baseline game, with payoffs as highlighted in bold in Table 2. For Players 1 and 2,
the payoffs are identical to those in the two player game. The third party, Player 3, is a
peacemaker who prefers both Player 1 and Player 2 to choose the dovish action, and his
payoffs are common knowledge.
Player 1
Player 2
Hawkish Dovish
Hawkish 95− c1, 95− c2,0 105− c1, 10,10
Dovish 10, 105− c2,90 95, 95,150
Table 2: Payoff matrix in the presence of a peacemaker.
While the third party cannot take any action that affects payoffs directly, it can make
public cheap talk announcements before Player 1 and 2 make their decisions. The timing of
the game is as follows. First, Nature draws c1 and c2. Second, Player 1 and the third party
observe c1, while Player 2 observes c2. Third, the third party sends a publicly observable
cheap talk messagem ∈ {Hawkish,Dovish}.10 Fourth, Player 1 and Player 2 simultaneously
choose their actions.
Theory predicts that communication by the peacemaker can only be uninformative. This
is because the peacemaker always wants to send the message which induces dovish behavior
by both players. As the only such message is the dovish message, his communication strategy
does not reflect any private information. The equilibrium cutoff remains the same as in the
two player game. A comparison between behavior in the two player game and the game with
10Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) show that it is without loss of generality to assume that the third party’s
message space contains only two messages, one of which makes Player 2 more likely to be hawkish.
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the peacemaker can therefore be used to address Question 1.
In the second treatment, we introduce a third player with different preferences. The
payoff matrix of this new game is shown in Table 3. For Players 1 and 2, the payoffs are
again identical to those in the two player game, while the payoffs of Player 3 are highlighted
in bold. In this treatment, the third party is a provocateur who strictly prefers Player 1 to
choose the hawkish action. He also prefers Player 2 to choose the dovish action regardless
of what Player 1 does. The provocateur’s payoffs are common knowledge. The timing of
events is the same as in the treatment with a peacemaker. Thus, the provocateur makes a
public cheap talk announcement after observing Player 1’s cost but before Player 1 and 2
make their decisions.11 Fourth, Player 1 and Player 2 simultaneously choose their actions.
Player 1
Player 2
Hawkish Dovish
Hawkish 95− c1, 95− c2,90 105− c1, 10,150
Dovish 10, 105− c2,0 95, 95,10
Table 3: Payoff matrix in the presence of a provocateur.
As discussed in Appendix A, this three player game has a unique informative communi-
cation equilibrium12 in which the provocateur sends hawkish messages if and only if Player
1’s cost is in some intermediate range.13 Equilibrium communication is influential and af-
fects behavior in two ways: 1) both Player 1 and Player 2 respond to the hawkish message
by choosing a hawkish action; 2) both players are more hawkish in this equilibrium than in
the game without the third party, regardless of whether the provocateur actually sends a
hawkish message.
11The public nature of communication is crucial. If the provocateur communicated privately with each
player, communication would necessarily be uninformative. To see this, first note that the provocateur would
always send to Player 2 the message that maximizes the probability that Player 2 will choose the dovish
action, which is commonly known to be the provocateur’s most preferred action by that player. As a result,
private communication with Player 2 will be uninformative. Consequently, Player 1 will also ignore the
provocateur’s message.
12Recall that a babbling equilibrium always exists in cheap talk games.
13Intuitively, when c1 is very high or very low, Player 1 has a strictly dominant strategy, and the provo-
cateur cannot influence Player 1’s behavior. He will therefore send the message that is more likely to induce
Player 2 to choose the dovish action. When c1 is in some intermediate range, the provocateur can potentially
affect Player 1’s behavior. Note that he would only want to affect this behavior in the direction of being
more hawkish. In this intermediate range, the provocateur will thus use his public announcement to induce
Player 1 to be hawkish by provoking Player 2. As actions are strategic complements, an increase in the
probability that Player 2 is hawkish will indeed lead Player 1 to best respond with a more hawkish stance.
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3.1 Implementation
Our experimental design employed a baseline two player condition and two treatments. In
the baseline condition, subjects played the conflict game described in Table 1 in groups of
two with no third party present. To keep the labeling neutral for the subjects, the hawkish
action was denoted by A and the dovish action by B. At the beginning of each round, each
subject observed her/his cost parameter and then chose between a hawkish and a dovish
action simultaneously with his opponent. At the end of the round, the subject observed
a complete summary of the information about the round, including her/his own and the
opponent’s chosen action, the number of points gained in the round, and the cumulative
number of points gained up until (and including) that round.
In the peacemaker treatment, subjects were matched in groups of three players (Player 1,
Player 2, and Player 3). Player 3 played the role of a third party peacemaker with payoffs as
in Table 2. The timing of the peacemaker treatment was as follows: i) Player 1 and Player
3 observed the realized cost of Player 1, and Player 2 observed its own cost; ii) Player 3 sent
a message m which was restricted to the set {A,B}; iii) Player 1 and Player 2 observed the
message sent by Player 3 and then simultaneously chose between A and B (a hawkish and
a dovish action); iv) Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3 observed a complete summary of the
information about the round, as in the two player condition, with additional information
about Player 3’s message. The timing and design of the provocateur treatment were similar,
with the exception that Player 3’s payoff matrix was as in Table 3.
We restricted Player 3’s message space to be equal to the action space available to Player
1 and Player 2. From a theoretical point of view, this restriction is without loss of generality
and therefore leaves all predictions unchanged. While the restriction may nevertheless be
empirically relevant, previous studies have found that subjects tend to interpret messages in
cheap talk games using a natural language (see, e.g. Blume et al, 2001).
Each session of the experiment started with either 13 rounds of the two player baseline,
13 rounds of the peacemaker treatment, or 13 rounds of the provocateur treatment. This
allowed us to perform a between-subjects analysis of the effect of introducing a third party
into the two player game. The first round in each case was an unpaid practice round, while the
remaining 12 rounds were incentivized. Subjects were randomly and anonymously matched
with randomly-assigned roles in the beginning of each round. The experiment was designed
with multiple rounds of play (as opposed to one-shot interactions) to facilitate learning.
We allowed subjects to experience different roles to facilitate a better understanding of the
incentives of every player in the game. While we did not employ a predefined rule to govern
9
role switching, all subjects were assigned a different role at least once in each session.
Motivated by a line of research investigating how learning in one game transfers to behav-
ior in a different, related game (see, e.g., Cooper and Kagel 2003, Rankin et al 2000, and Rick
and Weber 2010), subjects interacted for an additional 13 rounds in the second half of the
experiment. The subjects initially assigned to the two player condition played an additional
13 rounds (one unpaid, and 12 incentivized) of a game with a third party, who could be
either a peacemaker or a provocateur. This allowed us to assess whether previous exposure
to the two player conflict game affected subjects’ responsiveness to third-party messages.
Such a robustness check is particularly pressing in the case of a peacemaker, whose messages
in theory have no strategic content. Subjects initially assigned to one of the treatments with
a third party subsequently played the baseline conflict game with no third party.14
While the subjects were told in advance that the experiment will be divided into two
parts, they were not given the instructions for the second part of the experiment until the
last round of the first part of the experiment was finished.15 Therefore, subjects in all
sessions expected something to happen in the second half. To maximize recruiting and not
restrict ourselves to only 12 and 18 player-large sessions, we did not exclude subjects from
participating in cases where the number of subjects showing up to a session was not divisible
by either 2 or 3. When the number of subjects in a session was not divisible by 2 (for the
baseline game) and 3 (for the game with a third party), some subjects were randomly chosen
to sit out in every round. This was clearly explained to the subjects that participated in
every session. As discussed in Section 4 below, we control for heterogeneity in experience in
our econometric analysis and find that this has little effect on our main results.
Each session of the experiment started with subjects signing the consent forms, reading
the instructions, and completing an incentivized quiz.16 The subjects’ earnings were deter-
mined as follows. Every subject was guaranteed a 30 Mexican pesos (≈ US$2 at the time of
the experiment) show up fee in addition to the earnings from the quiz (1 Mexican peso for
each correct answer). These earnings were called the subject’s “guaranteed earnings.” In
14While we do not analyze behavior in the “two player after provocateur” and “two player after peace-
maker” conditions, we collected this data to guarantee both consistency in the description of the experiment
to the different subjects and also comparable earnings. In particular, participants in the sessions where the
two player condition came first were told that the experiment will have a second half.
15Specifically, the instructions stated: “We will provide you with instructions for the second part at the
end of the first part of the experiment.”
16The quiz tested the subjects’ understanding of the experiment with eight questions for the two player
baseline and ten questions for the provocateur and peacemaker treatments. The quiz was administered only
at the beginning of the first part of each session. For the second part of each session, subjects were given
the new instructions with additional time to read them but no additional quiz. All the instructions for the
experiment can be found at http://piotr-evdokimov.com/Online%20Appendix-Instructions.pdf.
10
addition, in each (non-practice) round of the game, the decisions of each subject and his/her
matched partners led the subject to gain a number of points. The subject’s “additional
earnings” were determined as follows:
Additional earnings =
Total points gained during the experiment
10
.
Therefore, subjects gained 10 Mexican pesos for each 100 points.
To avoid confusion, we highlight here that no within-subjects comparisons across different
treatments are made in our statistical analysis. That is, we never compare how the same
subject behaved in a two player game and a game with a third party. Whenever we analyze
our experimental data, we either focus on behavior in the first half of the experiment, or
behavior in the second half of the experiment (the latter when we study how prior experience
with the two player game affected subjects’ responses to their received messages).
3.2 Predictions
The model outlined above suggests the following set of predictions, which we refer to as the
strategic communication hypothesis :
Prediction 1. Communication is related to private information and effective at influencing
the conflicting parties’ behavior when the third party is a provocateur.
Prediction 2. Communication is unrelated to private information and has no effect on the
conflicting parties’ behavior when the third party is a peacemaker.
The considerations in the introduction (Question 2) motivate the question of how intro-
ducing social preferences affect the predictions above. To answer this question, we focus on
a special case of the model in Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2002), where a player
puts a weight λ on his own payoffs and weights (1− λ)/n on the payoffs of other players if
the number of other players is n.17 We call this the third party social preferences hypothesis.
As we show in Appendix A.3, an increase in the degree of social preferences (lower λ)
reduces the equilibrium cutoff and leads to less expected hawkish behavior in the two player
baseline. Because communication is uninformative in the treatment with a peacemaker, an
increase in the degree of social preferences also decreases hawkish behavior in this treatment.
Thus, allowing for social preferences leaves Prediction 1 unaffected. The treatment with a
17n = 1 without a third party and n = 2 when a third party is present. This formulation makes the
natural assumption that players care for their opponents’ payoffs equally.
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provocateur gives scope for strategic communication, thereby complicating the predictions
of a social preferences-based model. Focusing on the case where the provocateur’s messages
are not strategic, we show in Appendix A.3 that an increase in the degree of social prefer-
ences increases the equilibrium cutoff and leads to more expected hawkish behavior. Thus,
Prediction 2 can be generated both by a model with strategic communication and no social
preferences and a model that allows for social preferences without strategic communication.18
As argued by Schelling (1980), public announcements can exert an influence simply
through their suggestive power. This suggests that communication in our experiment might
have an effect on behavior regardless of the identity of the message sender, and regardless
of whether communication is informative in the sense of revealing private information. We
refer to this as the focal point hypothesis.
4 Results
The experiment was conducted at Instituto Tecnolo´gico Auto´nomo de Me´xico in Mexico
City in the Spring semester of 2015 using the software z -Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total
of 13 experimental sessions were conducted with an average of 15 subjects per session with
no subject participating more than once. An average session lasted for 75 minutes with an
individual average payment of 215 pesos (including a 30 peso show-up fee).19
101 subjects played the two player game in the first half of the experiment, 53 played the
game with the provocateur in the first half, and 46 played the game with the peacemaker in
the first half. As mentioned above, sessions that started with the two player baseline were
randomly assigned into one of two possible continuation treatments in the second half. 51 of
the subjects in these sessions were assigned to play the game with the provocateur and 50
to play the game with the peacemaker. The session information is summarized in Table 4.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, contrary to the strategic commu-
nication hypothesis, we find that neither the peacemakers’ nor the provocateurs’ messages
were significantly affected by their observed costs. This implies that the messages could not
have been used by Player 1 and Player 2 strategically. I.e., if subjects behaved according to
equilibrium, the equilibrium was uninformative. Second, despite the fact that the messages
were uninformative of costs, the choices of Player 1 and Player 2 were affected by what
18As explained in detail in Section 4.1, we find that provocateurs do not communicate strategically.
19Average earnings amounted to approximately 14 US dollars per subject at the time of the experiment.
The minimum wage in Mexico is small, about 70 pesos per day. For a better reference point, consider that
a 15km Uber ride from the house of one of the authors to the airport cost around 80 pesos at the time of
the experiment.
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Two player in first half, Three sessions
Provocateur in second half (16, 17, 18 subjects)
Two player in first half, Three sessions
Peacemaker in second half (11, 18, 21 subjects)
Provocateur in first half, Three sessions
Two player in second half (9, 13, 13, and 18 subjects)
Peacemaker in first half, Four sessions
Two player in second half (14, 16, 16 subjects)
Table 4: Subjects per treatment.
messages they received. While this result runs contrary to the uninformative equilibrium
predictions, it is consistent with the predictions of the focal point hypothesis. Given that
subjects’ messages were uninformative of costs, social preferences toward the third party
predict that the introduction of a provocateur increases the incidence of hawkish behavior
while the introduction of a peacemaker diminishes it.20 Our results reject these predictions.
In particular, we find that conditional on observing a dovish message, subjects’ behavior
was unaffected by the message sender’s identity. Moreover, introduction of a provocateur
left the likelihood of hawkish behavior unaffected on average. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 describe
our analysis in detail, while Section 5 provides a discussion and concludes.
Most of our analysis below focuses on the data collected in the first half of the experiment.
When results from the second half of the experiment are discussed, this is made explicit in
the text.
4.1 Messages
We first explore the communication strategies used by the third parties. In the first half
of the experiment, 49.51% of the provocateurs’ and 8.93% of the peacemakers’ messages
were hawkish, and these proportions were significantly different (P < 0.001 in a Fisher’s
exact test).21 We observe similar results in the treatments where subjects interacted with
the peacemaker or the provocateur in the second half of the experiment, that is, following
experience with the two player game. Specifically, we find no significant difference in how
20Recall from the previous section that both uninformative equilibrium with social preferences and infor-
mative equilibrium without social preferences predict that the introduction of a provocateur increases the
incidence of hawkish behavior.
21In every instance the results of a Fisher’s exact test are reported in the text, the results are robust to
estimating a logit regression with session clustered errors. I.e., none of our results rely on assuming that the
observations are independent at the subject-decision level.
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provocateurs (P = 0.316 in a Fisher’s exact test) or peacemakers (P = 0.699 in a Fisher’s
exact test) sent messages before and after experience with the two player game. 54.69% of
the provocateurs’ and 7.29% of the peacemakers’ messages were hawkish in the second half
of the experiment, and, as for inexperienced subjects, these proportions were significantly
different (P < 0.001 in a Fisher’s exact test).
We can compare the empirical distributions of the messages observed in the experiment
to those predicted by equilibrium behavior. In the experiment, ≈ 11% of the provocateur’s
messages should have been hawkish according to the strategic communication hypothesis.
Regardless of whether we focus on the first or second half of the experiment, and regardless
of how we compute the standard errors, we find that provocateurs sent significantly more
dovish messages than predicted by the theory (P < 0.01 in every test we ran). Moreover, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that 50% of the provocateurs’ messages were hawkish (P > 0.1).
Whereas peacemakers in theory should send only dovish messages, we find that the fraction
of hawkish messages sent in the experiment was significantly greater than zero (P < 0.01).
On the other hand, because the overall fraction of hawkish messages sent by peacemakers
was small (approximately 8%), such messages can plausibly be attributed to error.
For a more direct test of the strategic communication hypothesis, we need to study
how private information affected subjects’ messages. Figure 1 shows estimated nonlinear
relationships between the third parties’ observed costs and the messages they sent before
and after experience with the two player game (in the figure, a hawkish message is coded
as one and a dovish message as zero). The figure suggests that neither the provocateurs’
nor the peacemakers’ messages were strongly affected by private information (Player 1’s cost
of being hawkish). This observation provides evidence against the strategic communication
hypothesis in the case where the third party is a provocateur. Indeed, while informative
equilibrium behavior predicts that the provocateur sends a dovish message after observing
costs close to the extremes of the distribution, and a hawkish message after observing costs in
an intermediate range, the estimated fit for inexperienced provocateurs suggests less hawkish
messages close to the extremes. For provocateurs experienced with the two player game, the
fit shows a non-linear trend in the right direction, but the trend is not significant: we obtain
P-values greater than 0.1 on both the linear and the squared cost term in either an OLS or
a logit regression of a hawkish message dummy against cost and cost squared.22 Moreover,
the lowess fit looks little like the sharply inverted-U shape predicted by equilibrium. We
summarize these findings as follows:
22This is true regardless of whether we use independent, clustered, or boostrapped standard errors. We
also get non-significant coefficients if we pool the first and second half of the data.
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(a) Subjects before experience with the two player game.
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(b) Subjects experienced with the two player game.
Figure 1: Messages sent as a function of observed costs. The bold black lines represent
estimated nonlinear relationships obtained using a locally weighted regression (lowess), with
a hawkish message coded as one and a dovish message as zero. We find little relationship
between provocateurs’ observed costs and their sent messages before or after experience with
the two player game.
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Observation 1. The messages of both peacemakers and provocateurs were not informative
of private information.
We interpret the results that follow in light of this observation. In particular, we hence-
forth assume that the equilibrium is uninformative both in the game with a peacemaker and
in the game with a provocateur when discussing the theoretical predictions, including the
predictions of social preferences.
4.2 Responses to messages
We first study the effect of introducing a third party on the behavior of Players 1 and 2
without controlling for message content. Taking data from the first half of the experiment, we
compare the probabilities of choosing a hawkish action as a function of whether a peacemaker,
a provocateur, or no third party was present. To compute the standard errors, we use a logit
model in which a hawkish action dummy (=1 if a hawkish action was chosen) is regressed
against a constant term, a provocateur dummy (=1 if a provocateur was present), and a
peacemaker dummy (=1 if a peacemaker was present). As in all of the statistical analysis
described below, we focus on non-practice rounds and cluster the standard errors by session.
All of our main results are robust to different model specifications.23
We find that the probability of choosing the hawkish action was 36.4% in the two player
game, 18.5% in the presence of a peacemaker, and 33.8% in the presence of a provocateur.
Inconsistent with uninformative equilibrium behavior without social preferences, the pres-
ence of a peacemaker had a significant effect of reducing hawkish behavior (P < 0.001).
Inconsistent with uninformative equilibrium behavior with social preferences, the effect of
introducing the provocateur was not significant (P = 0.5372). Notice that these statisti-
cal comparisons are made between subjects, as they only make use of data from the first
half of the experiment. We now provide evidence that the message receivers’ behavior was
consistent with using messages as focal points.
How were subjects affected by third-party messages? To answer this question, we add
a hawkish message dummy (=1 if a hawkish message was sent), and a dummy representing
the interaction between the peacemaker dummy and a hawkish message dummy (=1 if a
hawkish message was sent in the presence of a peacemaker) to the logit model described in
the first paragraph of this section. Notice that these dummy variables allow for all possible
peacemaker/provocateur and hawkish/dovish message combinations.
23I.e., we get qualitatively and quantitatively similar results if we use a logit model with subject-level
random effects or bootstrapped standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3)
Players 1 and 2 Player 1 Player 2
Two player 0.364 0.355 ≮ 0.372
(0.0265) (0.0298) (0.0275)
Hawkish msg. 0.600**** 0.600** 0.600****
by peacemaker (0.0643) (0.102) (0.0519)
∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗
Dovish msg. 0.144**** 0.0980**** <∗∗∗ 0.190****
by peacemaker (0.00690) (0.0100) (0.0209)
Hawkish msg. 0.470*** 0.465*** ≮ 0.475**
by provocateur (0.0236) (0.0272) (0.0343)
∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗
Dovish msg. 0.209** 0.175**** ≮ 0.243
by provocateur (0.0565) (0.0403) (0.0752)
Observations 1920 960 960
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 5: Probabilities of choosing the hawkish action in different conditions of
the experiment. The standard errors are computed using the logit model described in the
text with observations clustered by session (in the second and third column, the explanatory
variables in the logit model are interacted with a player type dummy). The stars next to the
coefficients are associated with tests of the null hypothesis of each probability being equal
to that in the baseline “two player” condition. The stars next to the ∨ and < symbols refer
to across-row and across-column comparisons. The results suggest that hawkish behavior
is more likely following a hawkish message and less likely following a dovish message, both
overall and for Players 1 and 2 considered separately.
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The results of the relevant statistical comparisons are reported in the first column of
Table 5. The table reports the probabilities of choosing a hawkish action as a function of
what message was sent, if any, and what the message sender’s identity was. The first column
does so without differentiating between message receivers in the role of Player 1 and those
in the role of Player 2, while the second and third columns differentiate by player type. The
stars in each cell summarize the results of a (between-subjects) statistical comparison of the
probability in the cell to that in the baseline two player condition.
The comparisons in the first column of the table suggest that a hawkish message was effec-
tive at producing more hawkish behavior regardless of whether it was sent by a peacemaker
(P < 0.001, comparing the first and second row) or a provocateur (P < 0.01, comparing the
first and fourth row). Similarly, a dovish message was effective at producing more dovish
behavior regardless of whether it was sent by a peacemaker (P < 0.001, comparing the first
and third row) or a provocateur (P < 0.05, comparing the first and fifth row).
Another way to assess the effectiveness of third party messages is to compare behavior
after seeing a hawkish and a dovish message holding the identity of the third party fixed. We
find a significant difference in responses to hawkish and dovish messages sent by a peacemaker
(P < 0.001, comparing the second and third rows) and a provocateur (P < 0.001, comparing
the fourth and fifth rows). These across-row comparisons are summarized by the ∨ symbol
in Table 5. We conclude that message receivers responded to both acts of peacemaking and
provocation, which, as discussed in Section 5, is consistent with a focal point interpretation,
and summarize these findings as follows:
Observation 2. Despite not being informative of costs, the messages of both provocateurs
and peacemakers were effective at influencing behavior.
Comparing the probability of choosing a hawkish action following a dovish message sent
by a peacemaker and that sent by a provocateur (third and fifth rows of the first column of
the table), we find no significant difference in behavior (P = 0.2540). This suggests that the
identity of the third party had no effect on message receivers’ behavior in the case a dovish
message was sent. While the analogous comparison in the case of a hawkish message shows a
marginally significant effect (P < 0.1), only 15/168 (8.93%) messages sent by inexperienced
peacemakers were hawkish. This suggests that any effect of the message sender’s identity on
behavior was small. We summarize this as follows:
Observation 3. When a dovish message was sent, Player 3’s payoffs had no significant
effect on the behavior of Player 1 and Player 2.
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Observation 3 cannot be reconciled with social preferences toward the third party. Since
both the provocateur’s and the peacemaker’s messages had no strategic content, the only
difference from the point of view of the message receiver between a dovish message sent by a
provocateur or a peacemaker can be attributed to the difference in payoffs of the respective
third parties. That subjects were not more hawkish when the message was sent by the
provocateur (who desired the hawkish outcome more) than by the peacemaker (who desired
it less) suggests that they had little regard for the message senders’ payoffs.24
In theory, Player 1 and Player 2 respond to the provocateur’s messages differently (see
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) and Appendix A). To test this prediction, we added a Player
2 dummy to the logit model above and interacted it with each of the other explanatory
variables. We used the augmented model to calculate the probabilities and statistical com-
parisons analogous to those in the first column of Table 5 separately for Player 1 and Player
2. These are reported in the second and third columns of the same table. We find that both
Player 1 and Player 2 showed significant responses to their received messages, suggesting
that the overall results are not driven by any particular player type. Specifically, looking
at Player 1 showed more hawkish behavior following a hawkish than a dovish message sent
by a peacemaker (P < 0.001, comparing second and third rows of the second column) and
a provocateur (P < 0.001, comparing fourth and fifth rows). Similarly, Player 2 showed
more hawkish behavior following a hawkish than a dovish message sent by a peacemaker
(P < 0.001, comparing second and third rows of the third column) and a provocateur
(P < 0.05, comparing fourth and fifth rows). These across-row statistical comparisons are
summarized by the ∨ symbol in Table 6. While the two types of players responded differently
to a dovish message sent by a peacemaker (P < 0.01), there was no significant difference in
the case of a hawkish message sent by a peacemaker (P = 1) or a hawkish message sent by a
provocateur (P = 0.8055). When a dovish message was sent by a provocateur, the difference
in responses was small and not statistically significant (P = 0.1089).25
24Role switching, which occurs in our experiment, has been shown to decrease social preferences in trust
games (see, e.g. Burks et al, 2003). However, it cannot explain why behavior in each of the experimental
conditions is consistent with social preferences of Player 1 and Player 2 toward each other.
25Controlling for costs, we find that the latter P-value becomes statistically significant (P < 0.01); the
other statistical comparisons across Player 1 and Player 2 remain qualitatively similar to those reported in
the preceding paragraph. We also find that Result 3 holds separately for Player 1 and Player 2. That is, if
we look at the effect of the dovish message sender’s identity separately for Player 1 and Player 2, we find no
significant effects (P > 0.1 in both cases). We discuss other robustness checks in Section 4.3 below.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Contr. Matches Matches No Prev. not Prev. After two
for cost 1-6 7-12 sit-outs sender sender player game
Two player 0.359 0.347 < 0.370 0.390 0.359 - -
(0.0281) (0.0299) (0.0275) (0.0215) (0.0281) - -
Hawkish msg. 0.573**** 0.636**** ≯ 0.491 0.522 0.542**** ≮ 0.621*** 0.300
by peacem. (0.0427) (0.0743) (0.0924) (0.157) (0.0246) (0.0769) (0.095)
∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨
Dovish msg. 0.150**** 0.169**** ≯ 0.129**** 0.153**** 0.150**** ≮ 0.151**** 0.291
by peacem. (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0205) (0.0168) (0.0210) (0.0180) (0.0424)
Hawkish msg. 0.461*** 0.489*** ≯ 0.441 0.439 0.444** ≮ 0.494**** 0.490
by prov. (0.0218) (0.0336) (0.0424) (0.0277) (0.0334) (0.0233) (0.0245)
∨∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗ ∨∗∗∗ ∨∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗ ∨∗∗∗∗
Dovish msg. 0.232* 0.221* ≮ 0.246* 0.191*** 0.231 ≮ 0.234** 0.369
by prov. (0.0651) (0.0678) (0.0624) (0.0615) (0.0791) (0.0456) (0.040)
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1315 1668 252 768
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 6: Robustness checks. The results in Table 5 are little affected by controlling
for players’ observed costs (first column; observed costs are also controlled for in the other
columns). There is little difference in how subjects behaved in early and late matches of
the first half of the experiment (comparisons across second and third columns). Subjects
respond differently to hawkish and dovish messages if the analysis is restricted to subjects
who never sat out (fourth column). There is little difference in how subjects responded to
messages as a function of whether they acted as a message sender in the previous round
(comparisons across fifth and sixth columns). Subjects respond differently to hawkish and
dovish messages sent by a provocateur if the analysis is restricted to subjects experienced
with the two player game (last column).
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4.3 Robustness checks
We now discuss the results of several robustness checks of Observation 2 and Observation
3. First, we re-estimate the model used in the first column of Table 5 controlling for the
message receiver’s observed cost. The results, reported in the first column of Table 6, show
that this has little effect on our main observations. Thus, when the message sender was a
peacemaker, subjects were still more likely to be hawkish following a hawkish than a dovish
message (P < 0.001 comparing the estimated probabilities in the second and third rows).
The same is true when the message sender was a provocateur (P < 0.01, comparing the
fourth and fifth rows). This confirms Observation 2. In line with Observation 3, the message
sender’s identity still shows no significant effect on how the message receiver responded to a
dovish message (P = 0.2161).
In the second and third columns of Table 6, we control for observed costs as well as
interactions between each of the dummy variables used in the model of the first column of
Table 5 and a dummy for whether the observation falls in the first six or the last six of the
twelve non-practice matches of the first half of the experiment. We find that the estimated
probability of choosing a hawkish action does not differ across early and late matches when
a hawkish message was sent by a peacemaker (P = 0.1891), when a hawkish message was
sent by a provocateur (P = 0.4741), when a dovish message was sent be a peacemaker
(P = 0.1083), or when a dovish message was sent by a provocateur (P = 0.1749). While
we do find a marginally significant difference in how subjects behaved in the baseline two
player condition in early and late matches (P < 0.1), there is little learning overall. This
suggests that observations across early and late matches of the first half of the experiment
can be pooled.
Recall that our experimental design involved some subjects sitting out in some matches.
The fourth column of Table 6 repeats the analysis in the first column of the same table
focusing on subjects for which this never happened (146 out of 200, or 73% of the subjects).
Our main results hold when analysis is restricted to these subjects. Thus, message receivers
responded differently to hawkish and dovish messages sent by a peacemaker (P < 0.01;
second and fourth rows) and hawkish and dovish messages sent by a provocateur (P < 0.01;
third and fifth rows). This is in line with Observation 2. Consistent with Observation 3, the
message sender’s identity had no significant effect on behavior in the case a dovish message
was sent (P = 0.5473; fourth and fifth rows). These results suggest that our main results
were not strongly affected by subjects sitting out.
In the fifth and sixth columns of the table, we control for observed costs as well as
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interactions between each of the dummy variables used in the model of the first column and
a dummy variable for whether the message receiver acted as a message sender in the previous
match. We find that the estimated probability of choosing a hawkish action does not differ
across subjects who did and did not previously act as message sender (P > 0.1 in all cases).
This suggests that role switching did not have a substantial effect on subjects’ behavior.
Our final set of robustness checks focuses on subjects experienced with the two player
game. In the last column of Table 6, we study subjects in the treatment with a provocateur
in the second half of the experiment (51 subjects) as well as subjects in the treatment with
a peacemaker in the second half of the experiment (50 subjects), using the same model as
that in the first column of the table. Notice that all subjects analyzed in the last column
played 13 rounds of the two player game in the first half of the experiment. Notice also that
the “two player” cell in the first row of the last column of the table is left empty. This is
because we do not have a “two player after two player” condition in the experiment, and
hence no baseline to which behavior in the “provocateur after two player” and “peacemaker
after two player” conditions can be compared. We can nevertheless study how message
receivers experienced with the two player game responded to third-party messages, holding
the identity of the message sender fixed.
We find that subjects experienced with the two player game were significantly more likely
to be hawkish following a hawkish than a dovish message by a provocateur (P < 0.001,
comparing the fourth and fifth rows). They did not, however, show significantly different
responses to hawkish and dovish messages sent by a peacemaker (P = 0.8631, comparing
the second and third rows). This is partially consistent with Observation 2. In particular,
subjects experienced with the two player game responded to the provocateur’s messages
despite the fact that these messages were uninformative. Consistent with Observation 3,
we find no significant difference in how subjects responded to a dovish message sent by a
peacemaker or a provocateur (P = 0.1874; third and fifth rows). One interpretation of these
findings is that behavior of subjects experienced with the two player game was closer to
equilibrium than that of subjects in the first half of the experiment.26
Overall, the robustness checks in Table 6 suggest that Observation 2 and Observation
3 are robust to controlling for costs and different kinds of experience. Subjects responded
to uninformative messages and showed little difference in how they responded to dovish
messages sent by peacemakers and provocateurs.
26Recall from Section 3 that the peacemaker’s message has no effect on behavior in equilibrium.
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5 Discussion
Although the most informative equilibrium (MIE) criterion is commonly used in theoretical
work, it is inconsistent with the observation that provocateurs’ communication strategies are
not significantly related to private information (Observation 1). Uninformative equilibrium
also cannot explain our results, since it is inconsistent with the observation that the messages
of both peacemakers and provocateurs influenced the behavior of Player 1 and Player 2
(Observation 2). The third-party social preferences hypothesis is also inconsistent both
with the observation that subjects were not significantly affected by the presence of the
provocateur and the observation that behavior after receiving a dovish message was not
significantly affected by whether this message was sent by a provocateur or a peacemaker
(Observation 3).
One interpretation of our findings is that subjects interpret Player 3’s message as an
unbiased recommendation. For example, Charness (2000) found that self-serving cheap talk
is influential and helps players coordinate on efficient outcomes.27 While in our experiment
the messages are sent by an interested third party that responds to incentives, these messages
may still focus the attention of Player 1 and Player 2 on specific actions. If a player expects
his opponent to follow the message with sufficiently high probability, the message could serve
as a coordination device when the player is a coordination type.28 If coordination types are
sufficiently likely, the messages could be influential on average.29 If uninformative messages
are influential, the peacemaker should still only send dovish messages, while a provocateur
should send more hawkish than dovish messages relative to the equilibrium predictions. This
is what we observe in the data.
The explanation above leaves open the question of why the provocateur was equally
likely to send a dovish and a hawkish message, instead of sending the hawkish message with
a greater probability. One possibility is that a 50/50 distribution over the messages was
perceived as relatively unbiased by the provocateur, who found it attractive for that reason.30
While we do find that Player 1 and Player 2 responded to dovish messages differently, it’s
27Charness (2000) employs a complete information version of the stag hunt game and finds that when
one of the players sends a message before the actions are chosen, senders tend to send the dovish message
most of the time and, conditional on receiving the dovish message, choose the dovish action with very high
probability.
28A player is a coordination type when his cost is between 10 and 85, in which case the hawkish action is
a best response to a hawkish action and similarly for the dovish action.
29The probability that a player is a coordination type is ≈ 0.789 (= 85−1095 ) in all treatments of our
experiment.
30Similarly, a strategy that does not depend on Player 3’s observed costs might have appeared less biased
than a strategy that does.
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possible that both types of players would have responded less to a provocateur they perceived
as more biased against them.
Our main observations (1-3) are reflected in our analysis of players’ payoffs. In Table
7, we regress subjects’ payoffs on third-party dummies and a dummy for experience with
the two player game (=1 for observations in the second half of the experiment). In the
first three columns of the table, we study the payoffs of Player 1 and Player 2, while in the
last three columns we study the payoffs of the third party. Assuming that the equilibrium
is uninformative, we use the predicted payoffs (computed using the equilibrium strategies),
the observed payoffs, and the difference between the predicted and the observed payoffs as
dependent variables.
Uninformative equilibrium without social preferences predicts that the payoffs of Player
1 and Player 2 are unaffected by the presence of a third party. This can be seen in the first
column of Table 7.31. In the data, the presence of the peacemaker improved inexperienced
subjects’ payoffs (P < 0.001), while the presence of the provocateur left them unaffected.
These results are consistent with our findings in Section 4.2 that, not controlling for mes-
sages, the provocateur had no significant affect on subjects’ behavior while the peacemaker
made them less hawkish. Taking the difference of observed payoffs and those predicted by
uninformative equilibrium, we find that inexperienced subjects in the role of Player 1 and
Player 2 did better than predicted when the third party was a peacemaker (P < 0.001) but no
better or worse than predicted when the third party was a provocateur (P = 0.7940).32 The
payoffs of Player 3 are analyzed in the last three columns of the table with the peacemaker
treatment serving as the baseline. Both before and after experience with the two player
game, the peacemaker did better while the provocateur did worse than predicted (largest
P < 0.05) by uninformative equilibrium. That the provocateur did worse than predicted is
inconsistent with the predictions of social preferences toward the third party.
Risk aversion is an unlikely explanation for our results. While it is generally difficult to
formulate predictions in cheap talk games with risk averse agents, we can numerically solve
for the unique equilibrium of the baseline game in the presence of risk aversion. The analysis
conducted in Section A.5 for CRRA utility functions shows that an increase in the coefficient
of risk aversion increases the equilibrium cutoff. This implies that hawkish behavior should
be ex-ante more likely as players become more risk averse compared to the case of risk
neutrality. This is refuted by the data.
31To the extent we observe treatment effects, these effects are insignificant.
32Following experience with the two player game, subjects in the role of Player 1 and Player 2 did worse
than predicted in the presence of the provocateur (P < 0.1) and better than predicted in the presence of the
peacemaker (P < 0.01).
24
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Players 1 and 2 Player 3
Πtheory Πdata Πdata −Πtheory Πtheory Πdata Πdata −Πtheory
Prov. -0.1517 -1.142 -0.9905 -4.6289* -73.96**** -69.3312****
(1.3162) (2.917) (3.7936) (2.2468) (3.863) (5.8155)
Peacem. 1.3559 11.99**** 10.63****
(1.5729) (1.818) (2.3346)
Second half -2.9034** -6.859** -3.9552 1.5931 7.874 6.2806
(1.3311) (2.533) (3.4309) (9.0316) (6.395) (6.9586)
Second half -0.0935 -3.318 -3.2243 -10.7226 -33.60*** -22.8729**
× Peacem. (2.7632) (4.907) (4.2090) (9.3446) (9.187) (8.5789)
Constant 65.444**** 68.10**** 2.6525 67.62**** 119.1**** 51.4881****
(0.7854) (1.532) (1.9793) (0.877) (0.745) (1.1105)
Observations 2688 2688 2688 756 756 756
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 7: Treatment effects on individual payoffs and comparison with the pre-
diction of the uninformative communication equilibrium. Player 1 and 2 earned as
predicted by uninformative equilibrium both in the two player baseline and in the provo-
cateur treatment, but they earned more than predicted in the presence of a peacemaker;
Player 3 earned less than predicted in the role of a provocateur and more than predicted in
the role of a peacemaker.
While our data is consistent with Player 1 and Player 2 having social preferences toward
each other,33 it is unclear why a player would exhibit social preferences toward some of the
other players in the game but not others. For example, in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) monetary
payoffs of other players are treated symmetrically. An alternative interpretation of our data
is that Player 1 and Player 2 learn to coordinate on their welfare-maximizing, sometimes
off-equilibrium, outcome. In the context of complete information games, coordination on
efficiency has been widely documented in experiments (see, e.g., Rankin et al (2000)).
Our work is clearly just a first step in understanding the mechanisms behind strategic
manipulation of conflict. Could private communication also be influential even if it is inef-
fective in theory? How robust is the suggestive power of third party messages? How robust
is our finding that the provocateur’s messages are not strategic? Our experimental design
is such that the space of messages is coarse. We motivated this feature by the theoretical
result in Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) that only two messages, which can be labeled as hawk-
33Recall that subjects were less hawkish than predicted in every treatment of the experiment.
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ish and dovish, are sent in equilibrium of the three player game even if the message space
is unrestricted. In principle, it is plausible that with a finer message space subjects in the
laboratory coordinate on a different language. E.g., if the message space is made identical
to the space of Player 1’s possible costs, it’s possible that the message senders in the ex-
periment over- rather than under-communicate. These questions should be investigated in
future research.
26
References
Baliga S, Sjo¨stro¨m T (2004) Arms races and negotiations. The Review of Economic Studies
71:351–369
Baliga S, Sjo¨stro¨m T (2012) The strategy of manipulating conflict. The American Economic
Review 102(6):2897–2922
Bland J, Nikiforakis N (2015) Coordination with third-party externalities. European Eco-
nomic Review 80:1–15
Blume A, DeJong DV, Kim YG, Sprinkle GB (2001) Evolution of communication with partial
common interest. Games and Economic Behavior 37:79–120
Brandts J, MacLeod WB (1995) Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recom-
mended play. Games and Economic Behavior 11(1):36–63
Burks SV, Carpenter JP, Verhoogen E (2003) Playing both roles in the trust game. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 51(2):195–216
Cason TN, Sharma T (2007) Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental
study. Economic Theory 33(1):11–27
Charness G (2000) Self-serving cheap talk: A test of aumann’s conjecture. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 33:177–194
Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly
journal of Economics pp 817–869
Cooper D, Kagel JH (2003) Lessons learned: generalizing learning across games. The Amer-
ican Economic Review 93(2):202–207
Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly
journal of Economics pp 817–868
Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experi-
mental Economics 10:171–178
Galbiati R, Vertova P (2008) Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games.
Games and Economic Behavior 64(1):146–170
Levine DK (1998) Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of economic
dynamics 1(3):593–622
Mamdani M (2014) When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide
in Rwanda. Princeton University Press
McAdams RH, Nadler J (2005) Testing the focal point theory of legal compliance: The effect
of third-party expression in an experimental hawk/dove game. Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 2(1):87–123
Rankin FW, Van Huyck JB, Battalio RC (2000) Strategic similarity and emergent conven-
tions: Evidence from similar stag hunt games. Games and Economic Behavior 32(2):315–
337
Rick S, Weber RA (2010) Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played
repeatedly without feedback. Games and Economic Behavior 68:716–730
Schelling TC (1980) The strategy of conflict. Harvard university press
Stewart N (1951) Divide and rule: British policy in indian history. Science and Society
15(1):49–57
Van Huyck JB, Gillette AB, Battalio RC (1992) Credible assignments in coordination games.
Games and Economic Behavior 4(4):606–626
A Theoretical Background
The two player model is based on Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004). Consider the payoffs given
in Table 8.
Player 1
Player 2
Hawkish Dovish
Hawkish K − c1, K − c2 K + µ− c1, K − d
Dovish K − d,K + µ− c2 K,K
Table 8: Payoffs from the game.
If one player is hawkish while the other is dovish, the dovish player loses d > 0. The
hawkish player has to pay a cost of ci ≥ 0 for being hawkish but gains µ > 0 against a dovish
player. Being hawkish against a hawkish opponent simply results in a loss equal to ci. We
assume that the parameters K, d, and µ are common knowledge.
We are interested in the case in which the costs of choosing the hawkish action are private
information. We denote ci as Player i’s type. Player i knows ci but does not know cj. It is
common knowledge that the costs c1 and c2 are independently drawn from the same uniform
distribution F (c) with full support on [0, c¯]. We further make the following assumption,
which implies that the two players’ actions are strategic complements:
Assumption 1. µ < d < c¯.
A.1 Two Player
If ci < µ, the hawkish action is dominant for Player i. If ci > d, the dovish action is
dominant for Player i. If ci ∈ [µ, d], the hawkish action is a best response for Player i to
a hawkish action, while the dovish action is a best response to a dovish action. Following
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) we call the associated types dominant hawk, dominant dove, and
coordination type, respectively.
If the costs of choosing the hawkish action were common knowledge, we would have the
following equilibrium predictions:34
1. Dominant Hawk-Dominant Hawk : If both players are dominant hawks, then (Hawkish,Hawkish)
is the unique Nash equilibrium;
34We omit the equilibrium predictions when the types are inverted.
2. Dominant Hawk-Coordination Type: (Hawkish,Hawkish) is the unique Nash equilib-
rium;
3. Dominant Hawk-Dominant Dove: (Hawkish,Dovish) (or, (Dovish,Hawkish)) is the
unique Nash equilibrium;
4. Dominant Dove-Dominant Dove: (Dovish,Dovish) is the unique Nash equilibrium;
5. Dominant Dove-Coordination Type: (Dovish,Dovish) is the unique Nash equilibrium;
6. Coordination Type-Coordination Type: The game admits two pure strategy Nash equi-
libria, (Hawkish,Hawkish) and (Dovish,Dovish), as well as one mixed strategy equi-
librium in which each Player i plays Hawkish with probability ci−µ
d−µ , i = 1, 2.
The introduction of incomplete information about the costs of choosing the aggressive
action changes the equilibrium set. First, notice that the linearity of each player’s payoffs
in the cost of choosing the hawkish action implies that both agents use cutoff strategies in
every equilibrium. Let xj denote the cutoff used by Player j. Then, Player i believes that
Player j will play the hawkish action with probability F (xj) and will choose the hawkish
action himself if and only if his type ci is such that −ci + µ(1 − F (xj)) ≥ −F (xj)d or
ci ≤ µ+(d−µ)F (xj) ≡ Γ(xj). This implies that all equilibria are characterized by fixed points
of the mapping x = Γ(x). Because the types are uniformly and independently distributed,
there exists a unique equilibrium with the following cutoff:
c∗ =
c¯µ
c¯− d+ µ. (1)
Notice that an increase in the loss from playing the dovish action against a hawkish action,
d, increases the probability of hawkish behavior.35 Similarly, an increase in the benefit from
the hawkish action against a dovish action, µ, increases the probability of hawkish behavior.
For the parametrization of Table 1, which is the one we use in the experiment, the
equilibrium cutoff is given by c∗ = 47.5.
A.2 Game with Provocateur
We now consider the effect of introducing an additional player whose payoffs from the game
are given in Figure 9. As in the experiment, the provocateur observes Player 1’s cost of
35When d > c¯, a contagion effect arises in which all types of both players play the hawkish action. This
is shown in Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2004).
choosing a hawkish action and sends a public message. After observing the message as well
as their own costs, Player 1 and Player 2 make their decisions.
Player 1
Player 2
Hawkish Dovish
Hawkish eHH eHD
Dovish eDH eDD
Table 9: Payoffs of the provocateur from the game.
Assume that eHD > eHH > eDD > eDH , and that the provocateur can send one of two
messages: Hawkish or Dovish. The provocateur always prefers Player 1 to be hawkish, and
Player 2 to be dovish. An informative communication equilibrium with cutoffs x∗ and y∗
is such that c∗ < y∗ < x∗ < Γ(d) < d and the equilibrium communication strategy of the
provocateur is
m(c1) =
{
Hawkish if c1 ∈ (y∗,Γ(d)],
Dovish otherwise.
(2)
Player 1’s equilibrium strategy is
d1(m|c1) =

Hawkish if c1 ≤ y∗,
Hawkish if c1 ∈ (y∗,Γ(d)] and m = Hawkish,
Dovish if c1 ∈ (y∗,Γ(d)] and m = Dovish,
Dovish if c1 > Γ(d).
(3)
Player 2’s equilibrium strategy is
d2(m|c2) =

Hawkish if c2 ≤ x∗,
Hawkish if c2 ∈ (x∗, d] and m = Hawkish,
Dovish if c2 ∈ (x∗, d] and m = Dovish,
Dovish if c2 > d.
(4)
Given the uniform distribution, there exists a unique informative communication equi-
librium,36 and we can explicitly solve for the equilibrium cutoffs as
y∗ =
− (c¯− 2Γ(d)) +
√
(c¯− 2Γ(d))2 + 4µ (c¯− Γ(d)) c¯+d−µ
c¯
2
(6)
x∗ = c¯
y∗ − µ
d− µ (7)
Given our payoff choices for the experiment of c¯ = 95, d = 85, and µ = 10, we obtain
that c∗ = 47.5, x∗ = 68.65, y∗ = 64.2, and Γ(d) = 77.1.
A.3 Two Player Game with Social Preferences
Suppose that each agent maximizes a weighted average of his own payoffs, with weight
λ ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
, and the payoffs of his opponent, with weight 1− λ (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
Let pj denote the probability with which Player j chooses the hawkish action. Player i’s
expected payoff from choosing the dovish action is
− λdpj + (1− λ)E[(µ− cj)pj] (8)
while the expected payoff from choosing the hawkish action is
λ (−cipj + (µ− ci)(1− pj)) + (1− λ)E [−cjpj − d(1− pj)] (9)
Then, Player i’s net gain from choosing Hawkish over Dovish is given by
− λci + λ(d+ µ)− d+ (d− µ)pj (10)
which is monotone in ci. Therefore, all Bayesian Nash equilibria are still in cutoff strategies.
Letting pj = F (c) for some c, we can define the best response of Player i by
Γλ(c) =
λ(d+ µ)− d+ (d− µ)F (c)
λ
(11)
36From the proof of Theorem 3 in Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012), any informative communication equilibrium
must solve the system of equations y = Γ(x) and x = Ω(y) where
Ω(y) =
µ (1− F (Γ(d))) + F (y)d
(1− F (Γ(d))) + F (y) =⇒ Ω
′(y) =
(d− µ) (1− F (Γ(d)))F ′(y)
[(1− F (Γ(d))) + F (y)]2 (5)
The uniform distribution implies that Γ(x) is linear in x while Ω(y) is concave in y. Therefore, there can
only be a unique positive solution.
Notice that the best response is increasing in c given that d > µ. Γλ(0) =
λ(d+µ)−d
λ
> 0 if
and only if λ > d
d+µ
, and Γλ(c¯) =
λd−(1−λ)µ
λ
which is less than c¯, by our parametrization
c¯ = d+µ. Therefore, if λ > d
d+µ
, the continuity of Γ guarantees the existence of a fixed point
and consequently a BNE. The assumption of uniformly distributed costs, further implies
that there exists a unique BNE, which is symmetric by the symmetry of players, given by,37
c∗λ = c¯
λ(d+ µ)− d
λc¯− d+ µ (12)
If instead λ < d
d+µ
, then Γλ(c) > 0 if and only if c < c¯
d−λ(d+µ)
d−µ ≡ c˜. This implies that
Player i’s best response is to play Dovish regardless of the cost ci whenever Player j uses
a cutoff strategy with cutoff c ≤ c˜. Next if Player i chooses Dovish with probability 1,
that is, pi = 0, then Player j’s net gain from choosing Hawkish over Dovish is given by
−λcj + λ(d − µ) − d which is strictly negative by λ < dd+µ . Therefore, Player j also finds
optimal to choose Dovish with probability 1. This shows that the only equilibrium in which
one or both players adopt a cutoff lower than c˜ is c∗1 = 0 = c
∗
2. Notice that c˜ < c¯ if and only
if λ > µ
d+µ
. Therefore, when λ > µ
d+µ
, the only BNE involves players choosing Dovish for
any cost parameter. Finally notice that d > µ implies that µ
d+µ
< 1
2
≤ λ. This completes
the characterization.
Finally, notice that c∗1 = c
∗, the equilibrium cutoff without social preferences. Also, ∂c
∗
λ
∂λ
=
d(c¯−d)−µ2
(λc¯−d+µ)2 =
µ(d−µ)
(λc¯−d+µ)2 > 0 which shows that an increase in the degree of social preferences
(lower λ) reduces the equilibrium cutoff and leads to lower expected hawkish behavior.
A.4 Provocateur with Social Preferences when Communication is
Uninformative
In this section, we solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibria in the presence of a provocateur
when communication is uninformative and players display social preferences toward all other
players in the game. In this case, the provocateur affects behavior only through his presence.
For simplicity, we assume that a player puts a weight (1− λ) on his own payoffs and λ
2
over
the payoffs of the other players, with λ ∈ [0, 2
3
]
.
Let pj denote the probability with which Player j chooses the hawkish action. Player i’s
expected payoff from choosing the hawkish action is
(1− λ) [−cipj + (µ− ci)(1− pj)] + λ
2
E [−cjpj − d(1− pj)] + λ
2
[eAApj + eAB(1− pj)] (13)
37λ > dd+µ guarantees that the denominator of (12) is strictly positive.
Similarly, Player i’s expected payoff from choosing the dovish action is
(1− λ) [−dpj] + λ
2
E [(µ− cj)pj] + λ
2
[eBApj + eBB(1− pj)] (14)
Player i’s net gain from choosing Hawkish over Dovish is given by
−(1−λ)ci+
[
(1− λ)µ+ λ
2
(eHD − eDD − d)
]
+
pj
2
[λ ((eHH − eDH)− (eHD − eDD)) + (2− λ)(d− µ)]
(15)
Let
C(λ) ≡ λ ((eHH − eDH)− (eHD − eDD)) + (2− λ)(d− µ) (16)
D(λ) ≡ (1− λ)µ+ λ
2
(eHD − eDD − d) (17)
If maxλ∈[0,1]C(λ) > 0 and maxλ∈[0,1] D(λ) > 0, as is the case with our parametrization, then
ci ≤ D(λ)1−λ + C(λ)2(1−λ)pj. Then, a player’s best response is still increasing in the probability
that the opponent plays hawkish and linearly decreasing in own cost. This shows that best
responses are once again in cutoff strategies. Letting pj = F (cj) =
cj
c¯
, and solving for the
fixed point gives
c∗λ = min
{
2c¯D(λ)
2c¯(1− λ)− C(λ) , 1
}
(18)
Note that c∗0 = c
∗, where c∗ is the equilibrium cutoff from the baseline without social
preferences. With our parametrization, it can be shown numerically that c∗λ is increasing in
λ (See Figure 2).
A.5 Two Player Game with Risk Averse Preferences
Suppose that players are risk averse with Bernoulli utility function u(·) with u′ > 0, and
u′′ < 0. Let pj denote the probability with which Player j chooses the hawkish action. Player
i’s expected payoff from choosing the dovish action is
pju(K − d) + (1− pj)u(K) (19)
while the expected payoff from choosing the hawkish action is
pju (K − ci) + (1− pj)u (K + µ− ci) (20)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium cutoff as a function of the coefficient of social preferences of Player1
and Player 2 given the parameters of our experimental design: K = 95, µ = 10, d = 85,
c¯ = 95, eHH = 90, eHD = 150, eDH = 0, and eDD = 10.
Then, Player i’s net gain from choosing Hawkish over Dovish is given by
pj [(u(K)− u(K − d))− (u(K + µ− ci)− u(K − ci))] + [u(K + µ− ci)− u(K)] (21)
Differentiating the net gain with respect to ci gives
− (1− pj)u′(K + µ− ci)− pju′(K − ci) < 0 (22)
which shows that the net gain is still monotone (decreasing) in ci. Therefore, all BNEs
must still be in cutoff strategies. Suppose that Player j uses a cutoff point c, then he plays
Hawkish with probability c/c¯. In a symmetric BNE, the cutoff type c must be indifferent
between choosing Hawkish or Dovish. Further assuming a CRRA utility function, u(x) =
x1−α
1−α , the equation for the cutoff type is given by
c
[
K1−α − (K − d)1−α − (K + µ− c)1−α + (K − c)1−α] = c¯ [K1−α − (K + µ− c)1−α] (23)
While this equation cannot be solve in closed form, it can easily be solved numerically. Figure
3 plots the equilibrium cutoff as a function of the coefficient of risk aversion α, given the
coefficients of our experimental parametrization.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Equilibrium Cutoff with CRRA Preferences
Coefficient of Risk Aversion, alpha
Eq
ui
lib
riu
m
 C
ut
of
f
Figure 3: Equilibrium cutoff as a function of the coefficient of risk aversion given the param-
eters of our experimental design: K = 95, µ = 10, d = 85, c¯ = 95.
B Additional Analysis
B.1 Preliminary Analysis
If ci < 10 or ci > 85, Player i has a dominant strategy regardless of whether or not a third
party is present. Overall, subjects played dominated strategies 18.44% of the time.38 Given
that each subject played several games, the observation that a significant fraction of choices
was dominated is, perhaps, not surprising. If we look at subject-level data, we find that
64.5% of subjects showed no violations of dominance, 87% showed one or less violations,
and 96% two or less violations. Moreover, the probability of choosing a dominated strategy
decreased over time.39
38109 out of 591 observations, using data from the “two player first,” “provocateur first,” “peacemaker
first,” “peacemaker after two player” and “provocateur after two player” treatments.
39P < 0.01 in a logit regression where an indicator variable for a dominated choice is regressed against
period number.
Equilibrium behavior in every condition of the experiment is in cutoff strategies. If we
define a cutoff strategy as a strategy that always chooses Dovish if the cost exceeds some
amount and chooses Hawkish otherwise, and allow Player 1 and Player 2 to use different
cutoffs in the presence of a provocateur, we find that 41.58% of subjects (42 out of 101)
followed cutoff strategies in the two player game, 53.85% of subjects (56 out of 104) followed
type-dependent cutoff strategies in the presence of a provocateur, and 60.42% of subjects
(58 out of 96) followed cutoff strategies in the presence of a peacemaker.40 Even among the
subjects with cutoff strategies, the cutoffs showed a large degree of heterogeneity.41 Thus,
we find little evidence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium behavior in subjects’ choices.
We can also compare observed and predicted frequencies of choosing the hawkish action
in each treatment. Recall that in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the two player
game or the unique equilibrium of the game with the peacemaker without social preferences,
players are equally likely to choose the dovish and the hawkish action. In all informative
and uninformative equilibria of the game with the provocateur without social preferences,
the hawkish action is chosen with probability at least 0.5. We find, however, that subjects
in every treatment of the experiment chose the hawkish action less than 50% of the time
(P < 0.01 in every treatment using a one-sample test of proportions).
This observation is consistent with the hypothesis of Player 1 and Player 2 having social
preferences toward each other, as well as the hypothesis that the outcome (Dovish,Dovish),
which maximizes the welfare of Player 1 and Player 2, is focal.42 Indeed, Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) argue that unique symmetric efficient outcomes form “natural focal points” in the
laboratory. While the observation is interesting in its own right, it does not help us answer
our main research questions. I.e., we concede that it is possible that Player 1 and Player
2 may to some extent exhibit social preferences toward each other, but focus on the broad
issue of how their behavior can be manipulated by an interested third party.
B.2 Cutoff Strategies
40In the case of the provocateur and the peacemaker, we include data from both the first and second half
of the experiment.
41Individual strategies of subjects with cutoff strategies are shown in Figure 4 for the two player game;
Figure 5 for the game with the provocateur; Figure 6 for the game with the peacemaker. Following the
theoretical predictions, we allow subjects to use different cutoffs in the roles of Player 1 and Player 2 when
a provocateur is present.
42This behavior cannot be explained by risk aversion, which predicts more rather the less hawkish behavior
(see Section A.5). We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.
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Figure 4: Behavior of subjects with cutoff strategies in the two player game.
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Figure 5: Behavior of subjects with cutoff strategies in the game with an provocateur.
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Figure 6: Behavior of subjects with cutoff strategies in the game with a peacemaker.
